by the growing labor force participation of wives, which increased from 41 percent in 1970 to 57 percent in 1988. 4 However, since 1989, married women entered the labor force more slowly and by 2000 their labor force participation rate had increased to only 61.3 percent, and with it, occurred a slowdown in the growth of real living standards.
Another troubling change was the turnaround in inequality witnessed in the United States over the last quarter of the twentieth century. Inequality in the distribution of family income, which had remained virtually unchanged since the end of World War II until the late 1960s, increased sharply since then. What makes the rise in inequality particularly worrisome is that not only has the relative share of income fallen among the bottom half of the income distribution but so has their absolute income as well. The poverty rate, which had fallen by half from a postwar peak in 1959
(the first year the poverty rate was computed) to 1973, has since risen.
The main source of the rising inequality of family income stems from changes in the structure of the labor market. Among male workers alone, wage disparities widened between the high-payed workers and the low-paid ones. Another indication of the dramatic changes taking place in the labor market is the sharp rise in the returns to education, particularly a college degree, that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.
Current policy discussions in the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries have emphasized the need for better education of the labor force and the importance of the school-towork transition. The underlying theme is that more education, more training, apprenticeship programs, and, in general, more skill creation will lead to a more productive labor force and hence higher wages and faster economic growth. Moreover, presumably, a more equal distribution of income will ensue from a more equal distribution of human capital.
There has now accumulated abundant evidence that individual workers benefit in the job market when they receive additional training and education. But it is much less clear that living standards will increase and economic inequality decline if the government enhances opportunities for Americans to improve their job skills. Indeed, this paper will explore the reasons for this by investigating two other underlying paradoxes: (1) Even as educational attainment has increased in recent decades, real wages have still fallen. (2) As educational opportunities have improved for a broader swathe of the U.S. population, economic inequality has not fallen but rather has increased.
The paper will attempt to weigh whether government investment in education and training would be more or less effective at alleviating economic inequality and strengthening the U.S.
economy than direct subsidies to workers who are falling behind. Improved educational and training opportunities are essential for society for several reasons: (1) education provides benefits that transcend the job market, particularly a more knowledgeable citizenry for a democratic society (this was the original rationale for public education in the United States); (2) greater schooling and skills lead to more satisfying work opportunities; and (3) investment in training made by firms lowers worker turnover.
However, the evidence the paper will explore seems to show that such initiatives will not substantially alleviate inequality or bolster income. Confronting the inequality challenge may require direct subsidies to those at the bottom and tax relief for those workers in the middle who also have been falling behind. Labor law reform aimed at promoting unionization may also prove necessary to improve living standards for most workers.
1. Recent trends in income, poverty, and earnings
As shown in Figure 1 , median family income (the income of the average family, found in the middle of the distribution when families are ranked from lowest to highest in terms of income) but then increased by 43 percent in the succeeding 27 years. This is less than the increase over the preceding quarter century but greater than the rise in median family income. The disparity between the two series is due to differences in time trends between the mean and median. While mean and median income rose at about the same pace before 1973, mean income grew at a much faster rate than median income after 1973. The discrepancy stems from rising inequality since the early 1970s (see below).
Another issue concerns the use of the new CPS deflator, the so-called CPI-U-RS price index. As noted in footnote 2, the CPI-U-RS deflator incorporates quality and other adjustments.
However, the adjustments are made only for 1978 to the present. The CPI-U index is used for years prior to 1978. As a result, the CPI-U-RS shows a much slower rate of inflation after 1973 than the CPI-U: 288 versus 238 percent. If we use the CPI-U deflator, then median family income grew by 9 percent between 1973 and 2000, in comparison to the 25 percent growth rate on the basis of the CPI-U-RS deflator.
Another troubling change is with regard to poverty. Between 1959 and 1973, there was great success in reducing poverty in America, with the overall poverty rate declining by more than half, from 22.4 to 11.1 percent (see Figure 2 ). After that, the poverty rate generally trended upward, climbing to 15.1 percent in 1993, but it has since fallen back to 11.3 percent in of 1998, still above its low point in 1973. 6 Another indicator of the well-being of lower income families is the share of total income received by the bottom quintile ( which fell sharply, is that mean income was rising in the general population after 1974.
The main reason for this turnaround is that the real hourly wage (average wages and salaries of production and non-supervisory workers in the total private sector adjusted for inflation) has been falling since 1973. Between 1973 and 2000, the BLS real hourly wages fell by 8 percent (see Figure 3 ). This contrasts with the preceding years, 1947 to 1973, when real wages grew by 75 percent. Indeed, in 2000, the hourly wage was $14.08 per hour, about the same level as in 1968 (in real terms).
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Other measures of worker pay are shown in Figure 3 . The results are quite consistent among these alternative series. Average wages and salaries per FTEE grew by 2.3 percent per year 6 The data source for this section is the U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Detailed historical income and poverty tables from the March Current Population Survey 1947-1998", available on the Internet (see Footnote 3). 7 The first series is based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' hourly wage series and refer to the wages and salaries of production and non-supervisory workers in the total private sector. The next three wage series are the National Income and Product Accounts wages and salaries per full-time equivalent employee (FTEE), employee compensation (the sum of wages and salaries and employee benefits) per FTEE, and employee compensation plus half of proprietors' income per person engaged in production (PEP). The fifth series comes from the Current Population Survey (CPS). The first four series are deflated to constant dollars using the CPI-U price index. The fifth uses the CPI-U-RS deflator (see footnote 2 above). 11 The data are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Detailed historical income and poverty tables from the March Current Population Survey 1947-1998", available on the Internet (see Footnote 3). The average income-to-poverty ratios are computed by dividing the mean income of families in each quintile (as ranked by family income) by the mean poverty threshold of the families in that quintile. It would have been preferable to compute equivalent income for each family in the sample and then rerank the sample by equivalent income to obtain new "equivalent income" quintiles but the underlying data are not available.
income quintiles between the two periods. In the case of the middle quintile, the annual growth rate The last two series show the marginal tax rates at $67,000 and $33,000, respectively, both in 1995 dollars. The time patterns are quite a bit different for these than the first two. The marginal tax rate at $67,000 (about the sixtieth percentile) was relatively low in 1946, at 36 percent, generally trended upward, reaching 49 percent in 1980, before declining to 28 percent in 1986, where it has remained ever since. The marginal tax rate at $33,000 (about the thirtieth percentile) was also relatively low in 1946, at 25 percent, but it actually increased somewhat over time, reaching 28 percent in 1991 and since remaining at this level.
All in all, tax cuts over the postwar period have been much more generous for the rich, particularly the super-rich. Since 1946, the top marginal tax rate has fallen by more than half (54 percent), the marginal rate at $135,000 by 32 percent, and the marginal rate at $67,000 by 35 percent, while the rate at $33,000 actually increased by 13 percent.
Trends in schooling and earnings
One of the great success stories of the postwar era is the tremendous growth in schooling attainment in the U.S. population. This is documented in Figure 7 . Yet, as shown in Figure 10 , while income inequality has risen since the late 1960s, the variance of schooling (of adults 25 years of age or older, computed from CPS data), has trended sharply downward since 1950. In fact, the variance of schooling fell by 48 percent over the period from 1950 to 2000 (from 12.5 to 6.9). The simple correlation between the two series is, in fact, -0.78. This finding leads to the second paradox of the paper --namely, the growing discord between the inequality of income and the inequality of human capital.
Trends in productivity and profitability
Another anomaly arises when we consider the relation between productivity and earnings. In particular, the historical connection between labor productivity growth and real wage growth also appears to have broken down after 1973. In the case of an economy characterized by competitive input markets and constant returns to scale, it follows that wages and labor productivity should grow at exactly the same rate:
where X is total output, L is total employment, and α L is output elasticity of laobr, which equals the wage share in this special case.
From 1947 to 1973, real wages grew almost in tandem with the overall labor productivity growth (see Figure 11 ). 14 Indeed, the correlation coefficient between GDP per FTEE and employee compensation per FTEE is 1.00 for this period. As noted in the Introduction to the paper, the media has promoted the idea of people's capitalism --that all families are benefiting from the stock market boom of recent years. In this section, I look at recent trends in household wealth. I use marketable wealth (or net worth), which is defined as the current value of all marketable or fungible assets less the current value of debts. Net worth is thus the difference in value between total assets and total liabilities or debt. Total assets are defined as the sum of: (1) the gross value of owner-occupied housing; (2) other real estate owned by the household; (3) cash and demand deposits; (4) time and savings deposits, certificates of deposit, and money market accounts; (5) government bonds, corporate bonds, foreign bonds, and other financial securities; (6) the cash surrender value of life insurance plans; (7) the cash surrender value of pension plans, including IRAs, Keogh, and 401(k) plans; (8) corporate stock and mutual funds; (9) net equity in unincorporated businesses; and (10) 16 The source for the wealth series is: Wolff (1996) , extended to 1998 using data from the Federal Reserve Board's 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (see below).
to its low point of 14.8 percent in 1974 and then climbed to 20.7 percent in 1998. Changes in wealth inequality have thus been more marked than those in income disparities.
I next focus on the period from 1983 to 1998. The data sources used for this part of the study are the 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 and 1998. One reason for the slow growth in median wealth is evident from the third row of Table   1 , which shows that the percentage of households with zero or negative net worth increased from 15.5 percent in 1983 to 18.0 percent in 1998. The share of households with net worth less than $5,000 and less than $10,000 (both in 1998 dollars) also rose over the period.
Mean wealth is much higher than the median --$270,000 versus $61,000 in 1998. This implies that the vast bulk of household wealth is concentrated in the richest families. Mean wealth also showed a sharp increase from 1983 to 1989 followed by a rather precipitous decline from 1989 17 Full technical details on data sources and methods can be found in Wolff (2001) . to 1995, and then, buoyed largely by rising stock prices, another surge in 1998. Overall it was 27 percent higher in 1998 than in 1983, and 11 percent larger than in 1989.
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A comparison with income trends is also provided. Median household income, based on the Current Population Survey, increased by 11.2 percent from 1983 to 1989 and then by only 2.3 percent from 1989 to 1998. 19 The pattern is similar to that of median wealth, whose growth also slowed down substantially before and after 1989. Mean household income gained 25 percent between 1983 and 1998, in comparison to a 27 percent growth in mean household wealth. As with wealth, income grew faster in the 1983-89 period than in the 1989-98 period. percent from 1989 and its low point in 1992, and then surged by 10 percent from 1992 to 1998.
In Table 2 19 The statistics here differ from those portrayed in Figure 1 , which are based on family income. Table 2) Despite the overall gains in stock ownership, about half of middle class households had any stake in the stock market by 1998. Moreover, many of these families had only a minor stake. In 1998, while 50 percent of households owned some stock, only 35 percent had total stock holdings worth $5,000 or more and only 28 percent owned $10,000 or more of stock.
Conclusion
The last quarter of the twentieth century or so saw slow growing earnings, income, and wealth for the middle class, as well as a stagnating poverty rate and rising inequality. In contrast, the early postwar period witnessed rapid gains in wages, family income, and wealth for the middle class, in addition to a sharp decline in poverty, and a moderate fall in inequality. Personal tax rates have generally fallen over time but by much more for the rich than the middle class. In sum, the middle class has gotten squeezed in terms of income, earnings, and wealth since the early 1970s.
The "booming 1990s" has not brought much relief to the middle class. incredible success in reducing disparities of schooling within the American population, the inequality of income has not only failed to decline but has actually risen sharply over the last three decades. These results suggest a growing disconnect between earnings and schooling.
The main reason for the stagnation of labor earnings derives from a clear shift in national income away from labor and towards capital, particularly since the early 1980s. Over this period, both overall and corporate profitability has risen rather substantially, almost back to postwar highs.
The stock market has, in part, been fueled by rising profitability. While the capitalist class has gained from rising profits, workers have not experienced much progress in terms of wages. On the surface, at least, there appears to be a trade off between the advances in income and wealth made by the rich and the stagnation of income and wealth among the working class.
What can be done about the stagnating fortunes of the average (working) American?
Current policy discussions in Washington have emphasized better education of the labor force and improved training. Education and training are seen to be the key remedies for two major problems that ail the economy: (1) They will lead to higher skills and thus high paying jobs and increase the real wage. (2) They will lead to a more equitable distribution of skills in the labor force and thus reduce wage inequality. The results of the paper seem to cast doubts on the efficacy of this solution.
What should Washington do? I believe that the most effective way to reverse the decline of the real wage and to reduce income disparities is through incomes policy. Among the remedies that I propose are the following:
(1) Restore the minimum wage to its 1968 level. The minimum wage in 2000 was down about a third in real terms, from its peak level in 1968 (when the unemployment rate was only 3.6 percent!). Raising the minimum wage will help increase the wages of the low wage earners. A more powerful idea is to extend the coverage of "Living Wage" ordinances, which mandate a minimum wage, usually around $10.00 per hour, for city workers and those employed under city contracts. These programs are now in effect in a few dozen municipalities around the country but could be vastly extended.
(2) Extend the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC provides supplemental pay to low wage workers in the form of a tax credit on their federal income tax return. In fiscal year 1999, the EITC provided $29 billion in supplemental aid. An expansion of this credit will further raise the (post-tax) income of low income families.
(3) Make tax and transfer policy more redistributional. A more potent weapon to meet these objectives is to redesign our tax and income support systems so that they transfer more income from the rich to the poor. Tax policy over the last two decades, as shown above, have clearly benefited the rich over the poor (and capital over labor). Comparisons between the U.S. and other advanced industrial countries (including Canada), which face similar labor market conditions, indicate that tax and transfer policies can be effective in reducing inequality and increasing post-tax income (See, for example: Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding, 1995) (4) Re-empower labor. The findings presented here and the cross-national evidence compiled elsewhere suggest that one of the principal reasons for the greater level of inequality in this country and its relatively rapid rise in recent years in comparison to other advanced economies is the low level of unionization in this country (see, for example, Blau and Kahn, 1996) . This is also a principal factor in explaining declining real wages in the United States. Steps should be taken to help promote unionization in the workplace and expand the power of labor generally. This can start with reform of existing labor law. Other work has documented how existing labor law is biased against the establishment of new unions and how is notoriously difficult the certification 
